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Abstract
Side-channel communication is a form of traﬃc in which malicious parties communicate secretly over a wireless network. This
is often established through the modiﬁcation of Ethernet frame header ﬁelds, such as the Frame Check Sequence (FCS). The
FCS is responsible for determining whether or not a frame has been corrupted in transmission, and contains a value calculated
through the use of a predetermined polynomial. A malicious party may send messages that appear as nothing more than naturally
corrupted noise on a network to those who are not the intended recipient. We use a metric known as Hamming distance in an
attempt to diﬀerentiate purposely corrupted frames from naturally corrupted ones. In theory, it should be possible to recognize
purposely corrupted frames based on how high this Hamming distance value is, as it signiﬁes how many bits are diﬀerent between
the expected and the received FCS values. It is hypothesized that a range of threshold values based oﬀ of this metric exist, which
may allow for the detection of side-channel communication across all scenarios. We ran an experiment with human subjects in a
foot platoon formation and analyzed the data using a support vector machine. Our results show promise on the use of Hamming
distance for side-channel detection in MANETs.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET) provide an easily conﬁgurable mobile platform where nodes can communi-
cate without requiring the use of additional hardware to provide routing. While convenient, these networks are not
without their share of drawbacks in terms of security, management, or packet loss. As with all wireless networks,
there is some level of information loss or corruption due to signal fading, frame collisions, or environmental interfer-
ence. Due to this, packets can become corrupt and will be disregarded by wireless receivers as noise. Side-channel
communication takes advantage of this as a method for discretely transmitting messages between two or more nodes.
This process can be incredibly diﬃcult to detect since it is hard to tell these intentionally corrupted messages from
naturally corrupted ones; unfortunately for other nodes in a network, both appear as noise. Through the use of frame
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manipulation, it is possible for a malicious party to modify a frame in order for it to appear corrupted. Upon receiving
a corrupted frame, most nodes will simply discard the frame, disregarding its existence. This behaviour is expected
for all nodes on a network, unless the recipient has been conﬁgured in order to correctly receive and decode these
secret frames. The type of communication described herein is known as “side-channel communication”, and while
the process is conceptually simple to achieve, communication through this covert channel is diﬃcult to establish.
A network frame has several ﬁelds that are used for a variety of functions in transit, such as the source and
destination ﬁelds. The ﬁeld responsible for determining whether or not a frame has been corrupted in transmission is
known as the Frame Check Sequence (FCS), and is a four-octet length ﬁeld containing a value that is calculated prior
to transmission6. Upon arrival, the receiver node utilizes an agreed upon algorithm in an attempt to re-calculate the
value of the frame’s FCS ﬁeld via a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). If the calculated value matches the FCS ﬁeld’s
value, then the frame has arrived safely; however, if the calculated FCS value does not match the one present in the
frame, the frame is considered corrupted and immediately discarded by the node.
When determining a metric for use in detecting anomalous behaviour, such as side-channel, one of the requirements
is that it must provide consistent results. In dealing with a MANET environment, this becomes increasingly more
challenging as there is no guarantee of the surroundings or reliability of the network. There is also very little control
over factors such as interference, and as such, the metric must be unaﬀected by frame error rate (FER). Ametric known
as Hamming distance has been discovered to fulﬁll these requirements. We present the results of classifying traﬃc
using a support vector machine (SVM) in order to provide a range of thresholds to detect side-channel communication.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and provides background on side-channels
and the Hamming distance as a detection metric. Then Section 3 presents the experimental design to evaluate the
Hamming distance metric and the analysis of results using machine learning. The paper concludes with Section 4.
2. Background and Related Work
2.1. Steganography
Steganography is a form of covert communication that dates back several millennia that is used to hide a covert
message, but does not hide the fact that two parties are in communications8. In the internet age, steganography is most
commonly linked with techniques involving graphical images or audio ﬁles as a carrier medium; however, this is not
the only digital steganography currently in practice. Side-channel communication is actually a form of steganography
referred to as “Network Steganography”.
The research presented by Szczypiorski15 may be accredited as one of the pioneering articles in the topic of Net-
work Steganography. While most implementations of steganography systems are typically dedicated to multimedia,
the research presented in HICCUPS: Hidden Communication System for Corrupted Networks15 develops a stegano-
graphic system from a network perspective. Even though research in network steganography is not uncommon, many
techniques rely on optional packet header ﬁelds belonging to very speciﬁc network protocols7. HICCUPS15 was
developed with the idea that if messages are modiﬁed at the Data Link Layer of the OSI model, it is possible to take
advantage of naturally occurring imperfections in network transmission, such as noise. The results of the study by
Szczypiorski15 demonstrated that while steganographic communication may be possible, there are very speciﬁc and
challenging criteria that must be met. This includes the distinct lack of network interface cards that allow for the
modiﬁcation of frame header ﬁelds, such as the FCS ﬁeld, in order to develop this form of side-channel.
In a standard wireless network, all devices receive a copy of each message sent but often disregard those messages
when they are not the intended recipients. This functionality stems from the use of CSMA (Carrier Sense Multiple
Access) and CSMA/CD (CSMA with Collision Detection) protocols on a network. These protocols operate at the
Data Link Layer, and measure a network for an absence of traﬃc prior to transmission. The intended usage for these
protocols is to ensure that data collisions do not occur, or occur less frequently, on a shared medium such as a wireless
frequency. Szczypiorski15 identiﬁes these protocols as one of the properties required for a working implementation
of HICCUPS to exist. The suggested side-channel that is most relevant to this work is the “Corrupted Frame Mode”.
Szczypiorski15 proposed that information could be exchanged through frames which feature intentionally created
corrupt FCS ﬁelds. The beneﬁt of a channel of this design is that it provides the ability to utilize nearly 100% of the
bandwidth for a certain period, and relying on the functionality of CSMA, nodes that are not the intended recipients
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will simply discard these frames as noise. Szczypiorski15 felt that this method was out of the scope of his research,
as he was unable to acquire a network interface card allowing for the manual modiﬁcation of CRC checksums. While
initial research on his proposed channel was left largely untested in his work, it has become the focus of other works
(see e.g., 3,12).
2.2. Establishing a Side-Channel
Due to the obscure nature of the side-channel problem, it was unlikely that network simulators would oﬀer the
necessary functionality for modiﬁcation of source code oﬀ the shelf. As such, experiments were opted to be conducted
in a real network using real data, using a method for emulating the behavior of side-channel.
In his work, Najaﬁzadeh13 aimed to develop a system in which a side-channel link could be established. Previous
works in the topic15 had shown that a form of side-channel communication may be possible through modiﬁcation of
the FCS ﬁeld using the Sinalgo4 network simulator, an open source Java-based network simulator that provides an
easier platform for modiﬁcation than other simulators such as NS-2 or QualNet13. Najaﬁzadeh13 was able to establish
a simulated side-channel communication in what was otherwise a rudimentary application4. Using collected data
from his side-channel simulations, he examined the ratio of corrupt to non-corrupted traﬃc during periods where
there existed side-channel, comparing them to those that had no side-channel. He was able to show that a system
based oﬀ of the network’s historical data would showcase a high degree of variance in the amount of FER when
side-channel communication was occurring13. Using this, Najaﬁzadeh13 proposed an agent-based detection system
that would trigger an alert depending on whether or not the variance of FER fell outside of an upper bound.
Another approach to the detection of side-channel communication was presented through the use of the RTS/CTS
network mechanic by Madtha et al. 11 The Request to Send / Clear to Send (RTS/CTS) mechanic is one employed on
many wireless networks as an optional feature used to prevent information loss due to packet collisions. In a network
using this feature, a sender node will transmit an RTS frame to check the availability of a channel prior to sending out
a data packet. If the channel is available, the destination node will reply with a CTS frame, informing other nodes to
refrain from transmitting any data for a period of time. As soon as the sender node receives the CTS message, it will
begin transmitting data packets. In the work of Madtha et al. 11, it was hypothesized that for every side-channel frame,
there should be a corresponding RTS/CTS message pair. This means that the ratio of received application data and
RTS frames should be 1:1 in a network with no data loss. In the presence of side-channel, this ratio will increase, and
the amount of RTS messages will be signiﬁcantly higher11.
Several experiments were run using the QualNet14 simulator, including an increase in the number of nodes, a varied
number of side-channel links, and a range of inter-nodal distances. In the results presented by Madtha et al. 11 a distinct
increase in RTS messages was shown to be disproportionate to the amount of known data packets when a side-channel
is present. Unfortunately while this research provided promising results, several weaknesses were identiﬁed. In order
for their method to work, a network is required to be running the RTS/CTS mechanic, which may not necessarily hold
true for all networks. Additionally, this method is incredibly sensitive to Frame Error Rate, and in networks with a
high degree of FER, there will be substantially more RTS messages as packets become naturally corrupted and require
re-transmission, eﬀectively skewing the results. The research presented by Madtha et al. 11 demonstrated a need for
an FER insensitive metric.
With little to no available hardware for side-channel testing, the most likely option for experimentation was to
use a simulation environment. Simulators provide an inexpensive, scalable solution for testing, and typically allow
for easily modiﬁable parameters. Network simulators in particular also often provide channel models, routing, and
full TCP stacks. With support for the OLSR protocol, the ability to instantiate controlled mobility, and featuring a
full TCP/IP protocol stack, QualNet14 appears to be the ideal Simulator for side-channel experiments. Unfortunately,
there are several issues when attempting to post-process or analyze data from QualNet scenarios, as frames generated
within experiments are actually devoid of any useable information, such as FCS values. With no suitable simulator
alternatives on the horizon, the need for a real-world side-channel implementation is strengthened.
2.3. Cyclic Redundancy Check
In a wireless network, corrupted packets are typically detected through the use of a Frame Check Sequence (FCS).
Frame Check Sequences work by appending a ﬁxed-length binary sequence to the FCS ﬁeld in the frame. This
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Fig. 1. An XOR of the Default and Koopman CRC polynomials.
sequence is calculated by the source node based on the data within the frame. Upon receiving a frame, the destination
node recalculates the FCS sequence and compares it with the one included with the frame. If these values do not match,
the frame is considered corrupt, and the node may request retransmission or drop the frame. The most common type
of Frame Check Sequence is Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). This CRC value is calculated by considering the result
of the remainder when dividing the polynomial for the data payload by the CRC polynomial.
After a CRC value has been calculated, it is appended to the FCS ﬁeld and the frame may then be transmitted.
There is not just one standard CRC polynomial, but rather a set of standardized polynomials deﬁned by a variety of
organizations. While the CRC calculation does assist with the detection of transmission errors, it is entirely possible
that certain bits may corrupt in such a way that a receiver may still calculate a CRC identical to the one that was
sent10. Furthermore, the work conducted by Koopman and Chakravarty10 states that a given CRC polynomial may
operate more or less eﬀectively on any given application. Further work by Koopman9 demonstrates that a 32-bit CRC
polynomial, commonly known as the “Koopman Polynomial”, provided the best error detection out of any of the
standardised CRC calculations. As such, this is the CRC calculation that has been used for the experiments described
herein.
2.4. Hamming Distance
Throughout this work, the term “Hamming distance” refers to the number of bits that diﬀer between an expected
calculated CRC value and the actual value calculated by the recipient node. Hamming distance is a mathematical
concept that was introduced by Richard Hamming in 19505, and is commonly used today in coding theory when
comparing the diﬀerence between bit strings of equal length. Consider the following examples demonstrating the
Hamming distance between two similar, but diﬀerent strings: “CAT” & “CAR” have a diﬀerence (Hamming distance)
of 1 character. When dealing with binary strings, the Hamming distance is equal to the number of ones in an XOR
between two strings of length n. An example of this has been provided using the two CRC polynomials that will be
utilized in this research in Fig. 1. First, the Default and Koopman 32-bit CRC polynomials must be converted to their
binary notation, and then an XOR may be performed to get their Hamming distance. In Fig. 1 below, it is shown
that there are 13 positions with an XOR binary value of 1, meaning that the expected Hamming distance between the
Koopman and Default CRCs is 13. This, of course, does not mean that there will always be an Hamming distance
value of 13, as there is a chance that natural corruption may occur. This corruption may cause certain bits to ﬂip,
creating CRCs with a variety of Hamming distances.
3. Evaluating Hamming Distance using Machine Learning
3.1. Experimental Design
In order to establish an actual side-channel using hardware, one would need the ability to modify the FCS ﬁeld,
which, as with all MAC layer operations, is a functionality that is locked into the ﬁrmware of most current 802.11
wireless network cards. A chipset known as the Atheros AR5212 developed by Qualcomm1 supports a ﬂexible MAC
layer allowing for modiﬁcation of the device’s CRC algorithm. Unfortunately, devices with this chipset are no longer
in production. Without the ability to generate an alternative CRC using hardware, a substitute method for emulating
side-channel communication is necessary. The emulated side-channel must also be easily recognizable during the
analysis phase in order to allow for modiﬁcation in post-processing. The simplest way to execute this is to establish a
Constant Bitrate (CBR) communication on a port that diﬀers from the rest of the network traﬃc; for this, Nping was
used to send UDP messages at a ﬁxed rate.
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Fig. 2. Communication links between the side-channel and normal traﬃc.
The goal of the experiments is to simulate a military foot soldier platoon’s ad-hoc communication; as such, the
selected MANET protocol, the positioning of the nodes, and the communication methods have been kept in line with
potential real-world scenarios. For the experiments, a stable version of the OLSR protocol (0.6.8) was installed and
run on the wlan0 interface using Ubuntu 14.04. Each of the nodes were provided with a static IP Address belonging
to the 10.10.10.0/24 network, which allowed for a clear overview of the network activities in the live feed displayed
in Wireshark.
The “Fire Team Wedge” formation2 is one of the most basic formation a ﬁre team can select. This formation
provides the unit with visibility of the Team Leaders, while covering a large patrol area. The interval between soldiers
in this formation is suggested to be 10 meters, however this inter-operative distance is variable depending on a variety
of factors including visibility and terrain conditions. The ﬂexibility of the inter-operative spacing allowed for some
modiﬁcation to the platoon positioning in the experiments. Due to spatial limitations, and given that volunteers did
not have radios for communication, inter-operative positioning was reduced to a distance of 1.5 meters.
The original method of emulating side-channel, was to transmit traﬃc over a diﬀerent application than the Normal
traﬃc (for example, sending FTP data over port 21); however, during the initial testing process it was discovered that
generating traﬃc through this level of the TCP stack did not allow for enough control over the rate of transmission.
Nping is an open source network packet generation tool that is commonly used in networks for measuring response
times, detecting active hosts, and can even be used to generate raw packets for stress testing, ARP poisoning, or
Denial of Service attacks. The Nping tool is versatile, and provides the ability to control the rate of transmission,
number of packets sent, and destination port. For the experiments, side-channel traﬃc was transmitted across port
1337, while “Normal” traﬃc was sent through port 80. In the experiment scenarios that were run, the rate of side-
channel transmission was varied in order to test the Hamming distance detection technique against diﬀerent ratios of
side-channel to normal traﬃc communication. The agent node was not included in the OLSR network, but instead
simply captured nearby traﬃc in a promiscuous state using Wireshark and the AirPCap TX network capture card.
Fig. 2 shows the communication links and the direction of transmission between each of the nodes in the platoon,
where node 10.10.10.13 is transmitting side-channel, and the rest of the links consist of Normal traﬃc.
Two parameters that were varied for the experiments were: the ratio of side-channel to normal communication,
and the percentage of Frame Error Rate. While the ratio of side-channel to Normal traﬃc required running an addi-
tional experiment with each increase in volume, the modiﬁcation to the percentage of FER was achievable oﬄine in
post-processing. Each experiment was ﬁve minutes long. During each of the ﬁve-minute experiments, side-channel
communication would begin at the one minute and thirty second mark, and continue for ninety seconds. The experi-
ments were run a total of 12 times, with the number of side-channel messages per second increased by an additional
message each time in order to provide varying ratios of side-channel to normal traﬃc. The scenarios consisted of the
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following percentages of side-channel traﬃc: 9%, 12%, 14%, 19%, 22%, 25%, 28%, 30%, 33%, 35%, 37%, and 40%.
These percentages correlated directly to an additional 1 side-channel frame per second. Through post-processing, 22
diﬀerent levels of FER were introduced to each of the 12 experiments, creating 264 unique data sets for analysis.
In summary, both traﬃc types (side/non-side channel) consisted of 86-byte CBR packets. The deﬁning character-
istic that separated this traﬃc was that it was sent across diﬀerent ports, with Normal traﬃc sent via Port 80 and side-
channel traﬃc sent via Port 1337. The transfer rate of side-channel was dependent on the percentage of side-channel.
At 9% side-channel, there was 1 side-channel packet per second (i.e., 86 bytes per second for the 9% side-channel
scenario) increasing by one additional packet per second for each of the side-channel percentage scenarios up to 12
side-channel packets per second (1032 bytes per second for the 40% side-channel scenario). The side-channel traf-
ﬁc was sent for 1 minute out of the 5-minute scenarios. As per the Normal traﬃc, each of the three normal nodes
transmitted 1 packet per second (86 bytes per second × 3 = 258 bytes per second) for the entire 5-minute duration.
The Wireshark capture ﬁles were parsed using TShark in order to obtain the relevant frames, and then run through
MATLAB & Sinalgo. Frames corresponding to port 1337 were provided with a generated Koopman 32-bit CRC,
while all other traﬃc was provided with a standard 32-bit CRC. Frame Error Rate was artiﬁcially introduced by
corrupting a predetermined percentage of traﬃc using an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel.
3.2. Analysis of Results Using an SVM
The experiment featured 14% of the traﬃc as side-channel. In order to achieve the most optimal classiﬁcation
threshold, it is important to begin with a training set that demonstrates the cleanest separation between classes. As
such, the training set was formed using a scenario with 14% side-channel, but this time a version with an FER of just
0.83% was used. Selecting a scenario with such a low FER percentage ensures a signiﬁcantly lower count of naturally
corrupted frames, and oﬀers clear separation between the Hamming distances of the side-channel and Normal traﬃc.
Training was accomplished using a feature set containing all 2680 frames from the scenario. Once training was
complete, classiﬁcation was performed against the experiment with 14% side-channel and 25% FER. The additional
FER means more naturally corrupted frames appear, and a larger volume of Normal frames with high Hamming
distance values oﬀer a greater chance of misclassiﬁcation. As shown in Fig. 4, there are a large number of corrupted
Normal frames with Hamming diatances in the 5 – 12 range. Upon completing the training process using the training
data created based oﬀ of the Hamming distance values for this experiment, we generated a model ﬁle for classiﬁcation
that contained a threshold value. For this particular experiment, we deﬁned the threshold as 11.4559, which further
supports the proposed threshold range of 11 – 12.
With training complete, classiﬁcation using this model was performed on the 14% side-channel @ 25% FER
scenario. SVM classiﬁes items as positive or negative based on their value in relation to the deﬁned threshold. Items
that are classiﬁed as positive are assigned an SVM rank above zero, while negative items are assigned a value below
zero. Fig. 3 illustrates the predictions assigned by SVM for each of the frames, where the Y-axis represents the
SVM prediction and the X-axis represents the Frame Number. Frames above 0 on the Y-axis have been classiﬁed as
side-channel, while frames below 0 are classiﬁed as Normal traﬃc. For reference, the data points have been colour
coded based on their actual type. Frames with an SVM ranking above 0, that were accurately classiﬁed as side-
channel frames have been categorized as “True Positive,” while Normal frames have been assigned a category of
True Negative/False Positive depending on their SVM ranking. As the SVM rank increases or decreases, so does the
likelihood that the value belongs to a certain class. For example, it is 100% likely that a frame with a ranking of −11
is a Normal frame, while a frame with a rank of +31 is most deﬁnitely a side-channel frame.
In Fig.4, the SVM classiﬁcation has been graphed relative to the Hamming distance of each frame. The calculated
SVM threshold of 11 presented in12 has also been included for reference. While SVM does incorrectly classify 57
data points as side-channel, it still manages to correctly classify 2623 of the total possible 2680 frames. The threshold
shown through this SVM training (11.4559) is also conducive to the range of thresholds (11 – 12) we found earlier12
using the F-Score.
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Fig. 3. SVM Classiﬁcation of side-channel based on Hamming distances of a scenario with 14% side-channel at 25% FER.
Fig. 4. SVM Classiﬁcation of side-channel based on Hamming distances of a scenario with 14% side-channel at 25% FER.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented the concept of side-channel communication through the modiﬁcation of the CRC polyno-
mials in a military oriented MANET environment and attempted to detect it, providing a range of threshold values that
could be utilized across a variety of situations. The proposed threshold range of 11 – 12 should provide an excellent
starting point towards solving the issue of side-channel communication, as many of the techniques explored within
this work have resulted in thresholds of similar values belonging to this range.
There are several areas identiﬁed within this paper that could beneﬁt from additional research. First, the experi-
ments presented use the same CRC polynomials for Normal and side-channel frames, although there is no guarantee
that a malicious party would utilize one of these standard polynomials. Future work should be conducted through
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thorough experimentation on diﬀerent standard and non-standard CRC polynomials. Another mechanism employed
by many detection methods that could be further explored is Windowing, where a small subset is taken out of a larger
dataset for processing. Finally, further work into the validation of the Hamming distance mechanic could be per-
formed by comparing the calculated threshold range against those calculated through the use of other several machine
learning algorithms including Markov Chains, Bayesian modeling, and K-means. Further investigation into these
techniques could provide an increased conﬁdence for the threshold range.
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